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記事

2026年10月14日

著者:
Business and Human Rights Centre and Lawyers for Human Rights

Day 3: Wednesday 14 October

ITUC

Morning session

The 5th session continued this morning with negotiations on Articles 1.2-1.8 of the LBI, covering key definitions shaping the treaty's scope and framework. Article 1.2 (Adverse human rights impact) sparked debate over the terminology derived from the UN Guiding Principles. Palestine, Cuba and several civil society organisations (CSOs), proposed deleting the provision and incorporating its content into Article 1.3, arguing that references to "adverse human rights impacts" could weaken accountability, shifting attention from violations to outcomes. Japan, UK, and the IOE/USCIB favoured retaining the concept but sought greater legal precision and clearer links to internationally recognised human rights.

Article 1.3 (Human rights abuse) prompted substantive debate on the distinction between corporate abuses and state violations, and on questions of attribution and causation. The EU, UK, Japan and Saudi Arabia, supported maintaining a distinction between corporate abuses and state violations, citing consistency with international law. The EU reiterated that the legally binding instrument (LBI) should apply to all business enterprises, rather than being limited to transnational corporations, reflecting the universal approach underpinning the UNGPs and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD).

In parallel, Brazil, Palestine, and some NGOs argued that limiting the language to "abuses" could create accountability gaps, while unions stressed that corporate abuses and state violations may occur concurrently.

While many delegations supported an indicative rather than an exhaustive approach on Article 1.4 (Business activities), the EU sought clarification on references to "other activities". Brazil, Iceland, Palestine and several CSOs supported explicit references to digital technologies and AI. Instead, IOE and USCIB, cautioned against extending the definition to financing, investment and insurance activities, particularly where enterprises may have limited operational control. In relation to Article 1.5 (Business activities of a transnational character), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Saudi Arabia, and Iceland raised questions regarding the threshold for establishing transnational character and the legal certainty of the LBI. Brazil supported retaining provisions addressing significant cross-border impacts in the context of environmental disasters. Alongside this, ITUC advocated explicit recognition of global supply chains, reflecting on complex business operations impacts on labour rights. 

Questions concerning the scope of business relationships were discussed under Article 1.6, where the EU proposed a reference to Corporate Groups. Brazil and several CSOs supported the inclusion of financial institutions and funds, while Japan, Saudi Arabia and the IOE/USCIB favoured a narrower definition to avoid unclear application. 

Regarding Article 1.7 (Regional integration organisation), several delegations supported removing the provision from the definitions section, whereas some CSOs favoured retaining it. The morning session concluded with the exchange on Article 1.8 (Human rights due diligence), where Palestine stressed that due diligence should remain a binding legal standard across value chains and should not preclude liability or operate as a defense.

Afternoon session

The afternoon session continued negotiations on Article 1.8 - 1.10, with substantial discussion on human rights due diligence (Article 1.8) and the proposed definitions of the right to remedy and reparation, implementation mechanisms and the treaty’s purpose (Articles 1.9 and 1.9 bis), before moving to Article 2 (Statement of purpose).

Under Article 1.8, the Chair proposed streamlining the definition of human rights due diligence and moving some operational elements to Article 6. The UK supported the streamlined approach, while Uruguay stressed that restructuring should not reduce the scope of due diligence requirements. Several NGOs called for explicit environmental due diligence and stressed that compliance should not exempt companies from liability or obstruct access to justice. They also called for explicit recognition of environmental impacts and argued that due diligence should constitute an obligation for transnational corporations across their value chains. CSOs also raised Indigenous Peoples’ consent, child labour and risks associated with AI. They also requested clearer wording on whose processes and impacts the definition covers, alignment with the UNGPs and proportionality for smaller businesses.

On Articles 1.9 and 1.9 bis (Right to remedy and reparation), the Chair proposed distinguishing the broader right to remedy from specific forms of reparation, including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation and satisfaction. Palestine, Brazil, South Africa and Uruguay broadly welcomed aspects of the proposals, although several raised questions about their formulation. Palestine and several CSOs opposed making cessation and guarantees of non-repetition conditional, drawing on examples of delayed justice in Uganda and corporate involvement in Colombia’s armed conflict. The UK questioned whether the proposals created a new framing of remedy and reparation under international human rights law, while IOE and USCIB called for closer alignment with the UNGPs. Some NGOs stressed that remedy should remain consistent with existing international human rights standards. 

On Article 1.10 (Relevant state agencies), Palestine supported deleting the definition and restoring references to courts and non-judicial mechanisms throughout the text. Brazil preferred retaining it but could accept deletion if its functional content remained in Articles 7, 8 and 12, including protections for non-judicial mechanisms. 

Discussion also addressed human rights and environmental defenders, workers and environmental harms. A legal expert said the proposed reference to people assisting victims could encompass human rights and environmental defenders, while another clarified that value chains could extend beyond first-tier suppliers. Debate over “relevant state agencies” also had implications for Article 12, with Brazil stressing the role of labour inspectorates and non-judicial mechanisms. A legal expert clarified that Article 14.5 would guide the interpretation and implementation of trade and investment agreements consistently with human rights, without requiring states to revisit existing treaties.

On Article 2 (Statement of purpose), a key point of contention remained whether the treaty should focus on transnational business activities and whether businesses should have international human rights "obligations” or “responsibilities”. Brazil and Palestine advocated replacing corporate “responsibilities” with “obligations”. China favoured limiting the instrument to transnational activities, while EU and UK supported coverage of all businesses Palestine also called for environmental harm and conflict-affected areas to be covered. EU, Cuba and South Africa welcomed provisions addressing gender, age, children and disability. Civil society urged enforceable obligations across value chains, protection of Indigenous Peoples and defenders, and stronger environmental safeguards. Palestine called for explicit coverage of environmental harm and conflict-affected areas. Japan questioned framing mutual legal assistance in criminal matters as a means of preventing and mitigating abuses, proposing instead a reference to implementing the instrument’s measures. 

The Chair deferred Article 3 (Scope) discussions until the following morning.

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